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Labor Retrenchment Laws and their Effect on Wages and 
Employment: A Theoretical Investigation 
1. Introduction 
Many countries legislate guidelines or procedures to be followed, including 
compensation to be paid to the workers, in the event of their being dismissed or 
retrenched. At times, these laws virtually prohibit the dismissal of laborers, disregarding 
any contract that a worker and his or her employer may have signed at the time of 
employment. At times, the legislation includes some form of pre-determined severance 
compensation. This tendency to legislate conditions for compensation which override 
voluntary contracts, has been witnessed in many countries, with varying degrees of 
stringency. Some countries, such as India and France, are known for their strict anti-
retrenchment regulations. In the case of India, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, requires 
firms that employ 50 or more workers to pay a compensation, which is specified in the 
Act, to any worker who is retrenched. In addition, an amendment to the Act, which 
became effective in 1984, requires firms which employ more than 100 workers to 
actually seek prior permission from the government before retrenching workers. And, as 
Datta Chaudhuri (1994) has noted, the government seldom gives permission and, in 
general, places a lot of a priori restrictions on the terms for hiring and firing workers (see, 
also Mathur, 1989; Edgren, 1989; Papola, 1994)1. 
What is interesting about such laws is how lay opinion on them is at divergence 
from the opinion of economists. The popular wisdom on this issue is that these anti-
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retrenchment laws help labor, but hurt the development process, as they force firms to 
maintain huge workforces that reduce their ability to make profit. 
One problem with the conventional wisdom is that it fails to capture the fact that 
anti-retrenchment laws raise the effective cost of employing labor and, as a result, firms 
may hire fewer workers. Additionally, it is conceivable that, given the presence of such 
laws, some firms may not enter into production in the first place. Hence, the economists' 
view of this is often the opposite of the lay opinion: By burdening firms with the risk that 
they may not be able to fire their workers or that they will have to pay very large 
compensations in order to do so, the anti-retrenchment laws cause a decline in the 
demand for labor and thereby cause a lowering of wages and so ultimately hurt workers. 
This paper builds a theoretical model to analyze whether anti-retrenchment laws 
can be expected to help workers or not. The model is a useful tool of analysis for nations 
like India, France, Italy and Zimbabwe, which have stringent anti-retrenchment laws that 
have come in for criticism and debate and, in some cases, calls for repeal. It can also be 
useful for countries, like eastern European ones and China, which have weak anti-
retrenchment laws and have debated strengthening these. 
Our theoretical investigation reveals that the truth is more complicated than either 
of the two views mentioned above. In section 2 we first build a very simple benchmark 
model, in which there is no industry-wide risk but individual firms face stochastic shocks 
in each period which may cause fluctuations in the number of workers that they would 
ideally want to employ. We then consider two alternative legal regimes – one in which 
an employer cannot retrench workers once they are employed and another regime in 
which the employer can freely hire and fire. We show that even in such a simple model 
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there is no unique effect on wages: an anti-retrenchment law can cause wages to rise or 
fall, and aggregate employment to rise or fall, depending on the parametric conditions 
prevailing in the market. We then use this simple model to isolate conditions under 
which an anti-retrenchment law raises wages and employment and conditions under 
which it lowers wages and employment. 
In subsequent sections we progressively relax the assumptions of the benchmark 
model. Section 3 endogenizes industry size. Section 4 introduces an exogenously 
determined amount of compensation, s, that a firm has to pay each worker who is being 
dismissed. Then, s = 0 and s = ∞ correspond to the two regimes in the benchmark 
model. In Section 4 we also model the dynamic optimization problem that each firm 
faces. By using a combination of algebra and geometry we demonstrate how the labor 
market equilibrium can be characterized very simply. The model is then used to 
demonstrate a paradoxical result: As s rises, starting from zero, equilibrium wages fall (as 
expected). However beyond a certain point, further rises in s cause wages to rise. In 
other words, the relation between the exogenously specified cost to the firm of dismissing 
a worker and the equilibrium wage that prevails in the market is V-shaped. We also use 
the model to comment on the possibility of frictional unemployment and the consequence 
of industry size being endogenously determined. 
Among notable studies on this topic we would draw attention to papers by Lucas 
(1988), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Fallon and Lucas 
(1993), Anderson and Meyer (1994), Besley and Burgess (2004), and Basu (2006). 
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) use aggregate data from France, Germany, Italy and UK to 
calibrate their continuous-time stochastic model to analyze the labor demand of a single 
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monopolist in the face of changing hiring and firing costs. Their results, based on a 
partial equilibrium analysis, were that dismissal costs actually raised long run 
employment. Their results were based on a specific calibrated model and are therefore 
applicable primarily to the four countries studied. 
Anderson and Meyer (1994), using data on the United States, showed that if 
unemployment insurance taxes are seen as an adjustment cost for changes in labor size, 
then an increase in these taxes will decrease demand for labor in a high demand state, but 
will increase employment in a low demand state. In our paper we provide a theoretical 
validation for this observation and incorporate it into the anti-retrenchment setting. 
Fallon and Lucas (1993), in an empirical study on the anti-retrenchment laws in 
Zimbabwe and India, showed that as the laws were strengthened (making it more difficult 
to layoff a worker), long-run demand for employees fell by 25.2 percent and 17.5 percent, 
respectively. They could not determine any significant reduction in wages as a result of 
the laws. In the case of India the point has been made time and again that rigid labor 
market legislation may have hurt India's overall growth and efficiency. The claim that is 
being forwarded in this paper is different. It is being argued that the legislation may have 
hurt the very constituency that it was meant to protect, to wit, labor. Hence, Kannan's 
(1994) observation that wages in the eighties have not kept pace with labor productivity 
and Ghose's (1994) finding that employment per unit of gross value added in 
manufacturing fell monotonically throughout the eighties (see, also, Dev, 2000) sit very 
well with the theoretical findings of this paper and the fact that India's labor market 
legislation was made more rigid in the eighties.2 In fact, data from Annual Survey of 
Industries, Government of India, show that, between 1982-83 and 1990-91, the number of 
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workers employed in firms employing 100 to 199 workers fell by 28.5 percent and the 
number of workers employed in firms employing over 200 workers fell by 43%. It should 
be recalled that in 1984 new laws were enacted making retrenchment by firms employing 
over 100 workers especially difficult. It is not surprising that firms would respond to this 
by cutting down on labor intensity or switching over to contract labor. 
In this paper, we abstract away from specific institutional aspects of job security 
legislation and of the industrial labor markets in different countries, and use a 
parsimonious version, which we believe capture pertinent aspects of the economic 
environment. We show that the special case, which is nested within a general model, 
produces theoretically ambiguous labor market effects. Thus, the seemingly 
contradictory results obtained in the literature, where in some cases more restrictive anti-
retrenchment laws cause a fall in employment versus the cases where they result in a rise 
in employment, can be obtained from the single model presented in this paper for 
different parameter values. 
It is hoped that these results will not only provoke further empirical work, but 
give us pause for thought in our effort to draft policy and legislation to improve labor 
standards and, more generally, labor welfare. 
2. Labor Market Equilibria With or Without Retrenchment 
In this section we model the likely effects of anti-retrenchment laws. We shall, in 
particular, consider two alternative legal regimes: one in which employers are free to 
retrench workers at will and another in which no retrenchment, whatsoever, is allowed. 
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These will be referred to as the "free retrenchment (F) regime" and "no retrenchment (N) 
regime", respectively. Reality is, of course, more complicated, where retrenchment laws 
take shades of gray instead of being black and white. However, formalizing the two 
polar cases helps us fix our ideas and gives us some benchmarks to use. Once we have 
formalized these we shall go on in Section 4 to formulate an intermediate case with 
severance compensation. 
Our aim in this section is to model the kinds of equilibria that arise in the labor 
market under the F and N regimes. In particular, we want to study the impact of 
alternative legal regimes on wages and employment. Since anti-retrenchment laws are 
enacted with the aim of enhancing the welfare of labor it is worth checking formally 
whether this actually happens, once everyone has had time to adjust to the new laws. As 
stated in intuitive terms earlier, it turns out that anti-retrenchment laws do not always 
help workers. The formal model below illustrates how, given certain parametric 
configurations, a switch from regime F to regime N can actually lower the wage and 
aggregate employment. In other words, if such parametric configurations occur, the anti-
retrenchment legislation would, paradoxically, work to the laborers' detriment. It is 
shown that there are also parametric configurations where the non-paradoxical result 
occurs, that is, workers' wages rise. 
As a base case, let us suppose there are n identical firms, each endowed with a 
production function as follows: 
x = cpf(L); f (L) >0,f"(L)<0. (1) 
L is the amount of labor used by the firm, x the firm's output, and cp a stochastic variable 
which takes values of 1 and 0 with probability p and (1-p) respectively. To keep the 
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algebra simple we model this stochastic shock as being independent across firms and 
across time, thereby ruling out industry-wide fluctuations and intertemporally correlated 
shocks.3 Then, appealing to the law of large numbers, we assume that in each period a 
randomly selected pn firms have cp =1 and (1-p)n firms have cp = 0.4 We ignore the 
integer problem here by assuming that pn is an integer. 
It is also assumed, for the time being, that in each period or year each firm gets to 
see cp before making its hiring decision. If for a certain firm cp = 1, we shall describe that 
as a good year for the firm. A bad year is one in which cp = 0. There are different ways 
of interpreting (p. It could represent input and technology shocks that firms receive. In a 
bad year cp = 0 and the firm is unable to produce. Alternatively, as suggested in footnote 
3, we could think of (p as denoting the price of the product. The firms are scattered in 
different geographical locations. In each location demand for the product can be high or 
low. When demand is high, the price of the product in one and demand is low, it is zero. 
Let us first model the F regime. Each firm is free to hire and lay off workers as it 
sees fit. In a good year, a firm's demand for labor is given by solving the following 
problem: 
Maximize f(L)-wL. 
L 
The first order condition is given by: 
f'(L) = w. (2) 
Since f"(L) < 0, the function f (L) can be inverted and written as g(w). Hence, in a good 
year, with market wage w, a firm's demand for labor is given by 
L = g(w). (3) 
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In a bad year since cp = 0, a firm's demand for labor is obviously 0. Hence in the F 
regime, the aggregate demand for labor is given by png(w). 
Let the aggregate supply function of labor be given by s(w) such that s'(w) > 0. 
Assuming that the usual equilibrating forces are free to operate in the F regime, the 
market equilibrium is one in which aggregate labor demand equals aggregate labor 
supply. Clearly wF is the equilibrium wage in the F-regime if and only if 
png(wF) = s(wF). (4) 
Figure 1, below, depicts this equilibrium. The equilibrium amount of labor 
demanded and supplied is denoted by LF. 
Let us now depict the equilibrium in an N-regime. We are therefore considering 
an economy in which there is a law requiring that once a firm hires a laborer it cannot 
retrench him. 
Since we already know what the aggregate supply curve is, namely, s(w), all we 
have to do is to work out the demand for labor in this regime and then look for the wage 
that equates demand and supply. 
A short-cut method for working out the demand for labor in an N-regime is to 
assume that each employer must decide how much labor to hire before cp is revealed. 
What we are claiming is that, in an N-regime, this is a good approximation of the case 
where the firms have to choose how many workers to hire, after seeing the value of (p. 
The reason why this method works is that apart from the first period, the employer will 
(in an N-regime) be effectively stuck with a certain amount of labor in all periods without 
knowing each period's realization of cp. So unless the future is too heavily discounted, the 
fact that cp is known in one period, namely, the first period is of negligible importance. 
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Hence, our method causes an error, but of a sufficiently small order, so that it may be 
ignored. This is demonstrated in Appendix 1. 
For a risk-neutral firm that does not know the value of cp in advance, in the N-
regime, the firm's problem is to maximize expected profits 
Maximize [pf(L)-wL]. 
L 
Hence, by the first-order condition we get 
f'(L) = w/p. (5) 
Hence, the firm's demand for labor is given by: 
L = g(w/p), (6) 
where g(.) is, as before, the inverse of f (L). 
Because each firm is identical ex ante, the aggregate demand for labor is ng(w/p). 
So wN is an equilibrium wage in an N-regime if the amount of labor demanded equals the 
amount supplied at that wage: 
ng(wN/p) = s(wN). (7) 
On inspecting (4) and (7) it appears possible that wN may exceed wF, be less than wF, or 
be the same as wF depending on the value of p and the shape of the g(.) function. This is 
easily proved by considering the following special case of the above model. Let the 
production function, f(L), be the following quadratic one. 
f(L) = (A/B)L-L 2 /2B (8) 
with A, B > 0. As long as L is less than A (and we shall throughout confine attention to 
such cases), (8) is a reasonable production function, satisfying f (L) > 0 and f"(L) < 0. It 
is easy to verify that (8) implies that the firm has a linear labor demand function 
g(w) = A - Bw. (9) 
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Using (9) the aggregate demand for labor in the economy is given by 
LF = pn[A – Bw] (10) 
in the F-regime, and by 
LN = n[A – Bw/p] (11) 
in the N-regime. These two labor demand curves are illustrated in Figure 2. One sees 
that they necessarily cross. The point of intersection is denoted by E. 
Suppose we begin with a world in which retrenchments are freely allowed. 
Hence, the aggregate demand curve of labor is given by the steeper demand curve in 
Figure 2, marked 'Demand in F-regime'. If the laws of the land are changed and firms are 
not allowed to retrench labor, the effect on wages depends on where the initial 
equilibrium was. Suppose first that the labor supply curve was like the curve marked SS 
in Figure 2, so that the equilibrium lay to the left of E, at the point labeled EF in the 
figure. Then a switch to the N-regime would move the equilibrium from EF to EN, 
thereby lowering wages and employment, and hurting workers. On the other hand, if the 
labor supply curve is to the right of E, as for curve S'S', and the equilibrium was at EF ', a 
switch to the N-regime moves the equilibrium to EN', raising wages and employment, and 
benefiting workers. The special case of p = ½ is analyzed in the following footnote.5 
Thus far we have assumed that the labor supply function, s(w), remains 
unaffected by regime switches between no-retrenchment (N) and free-retrenchment (F) 
regimes. At one level this is as it should be, since, in the aggregate, there is no 
involuntary unemployment in our model. But, if we assume that workers mind the 
transaction cost of switching jobs, the same wage w is more attractive to the worker when 
it comes with a no-retrenchment clause. Extending our assumption that a better offer 
11 
elicits a greater labor supply, we may assume we have two supply functions, sF(.) and 
sN(.), for the two regimes, and that, for all w,6 
sF(w) ≤ sN(w). 
This complicates the analysis in Figure 2. If the original equilibrium were at EF, then a 
switch in regime to no-retrenchment causes an even more precipitous fall in the wage, 
since SS shifts right as the regime changes. However the effect on employment is now 
ambiguous. If SN is sufficiently to the right of SF, employment may actually rise. 
Moreover, the welfare-effect of the switch in regime is also ambiguous, since the same 
wage in an N-regime gives greater welfare to the worker (by virtue of a lower 
transactions cost). Hence a lower wage in an N-regime may or may not give lower total 
welfare. 
Similarly if the original equilibrium were at EF ', a change of regime to no-
retrenchment will now exert a smaller upward pressure on wages. Indeed wages may 
now fall. This will happen if the rightward shift of S'S' is sufficiently large. 
So far we have shown that the special case of the simple model is theoretically 
ambiguous. Our aim now is to generalize this model in stages. 
3. Endogenizing Industry Size 
In the above exercise we assumed industry size to be fixed at n. Let us now 
suppose, as is often assumed in models of perfect competition with free entry, that there 
is a very large number of firms and, in equilibrium, industry size gets determined 
endogenously by using a zero expected profit condition. 
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To avoid some trivial equilibria with zero production, we shall make a small 
modification to the function f(L). We assume that there exists some positive number, K, 
such that, for all L < K,f (L) = 0, and for all L > K, f '(L) > 0, f "(L) < 0. In other words, 
the total product (TP) curve, f(L), the marginal product (MP) curve, f '(L), and the 
average product (AP) curve, f(L)/L, looks as in Figure 3 below. 
Now define, as before, 
g(w) = argmax[/(Z) - wL]. 
(L) 
How do the equilibria in the F and N regimes compare? 
Maintaining the assumption of free entry of firms, consider first a free-
retrenchment (F) regime. If the wage is w, in the F-regime each firm earns a profit of 
f(g(w)) - wg(w). 
New firms will keep entering the industry as long as the above expression is greater than 
zero. Likewise if the expected profit is less than zero we do not have an equilibrium 
since firms will be exiting from the industry. In other words, in an F-regime, an 
equilibrium wage is w, where this is defined implicitly by, 
f(g(w)) - wg(w) = 0. 
w is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. 
Now consider the no-retrenchment (N) regime. A firm in an N-regime facing 
wage w, expects to earn 
pf(L) - wL 
if it hires L workers. As Appendix 1 shows, this can be justified in a limiting sense even 
in a dynamic model. Define 
£(w) = argmax[pf(L) - wL]. 
L 
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It should be evident from the previous section that this function is the same as g(w/p). 
If the wage is w in an N-regime each firm expects to earn a profit of: 
pf (l(w)) - w l(w). 
Hence, using a justification as above, we find that in an N-regime, w is an equilibrium 
= 
wage if: 
pf(l(w)) - w l(w) = 0. 
= = = 
We now have the following: 
Claim: w < w and l(w) = L(w). 
= = 
To prove this claim observe that to define w as opposed to w we simply have to pretend 
= 
that the production function f(L) is instead pf(L). Whatever we do with f(L) to get to w, 
we have to do with pf(L) to get to w . It is obvious from Figure 3 that 
= 
w = max[f(L)/L]. 
Hence, 
w = max[pf(L)/L]. 
= 
Since p < 1, it follows that w < w. Clearly, the value of L that maximizes f(L)/L also 
= 
maximizes pf(L)/L. Hence, l(w) = g(w). This establishes the above claim. 
= 
In Figure 4, let w and w be as shown and let s(w) be the aggregate supply curve 
= 
of labor. Hence aggregate employment in the F-regime will be LF and in the N-regime 
LN as shown. 
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What happens to industry size as we switch regimes from N to F? The number of 
firms in the N and F regimes are given by, respectively, LN/ l(w) and LF/g(w). Since by 
= = 
the above claim l(w) = g(w) and given LF > LN , it follows that 
= = 
LF LN 
_
 > = . 
g(w) l(w) 
_ = 
Therefore, as expected, the industry is larger under the F-regime, and so too are 
wages and employment. Therefore, in a country in which, for reasons of law, institutions 
or technology, there is free entry into industries, a no-retrenchment regime is 
unequivocally worse for the workers. 
4. Model with Worker Compensation and Optimization over Time 
4.1 The Case of No Frictional Unemployment 
In this section we generalize the preceding model by assuming that, as in reality, 
the government does not ban retrenchments nor make them totally free, but instead insists 
that when a firm lays off a worker, it makes a severance payment of s to the worker. In 
this model we also make the inter-temporal decision of the firm explicit. Suppose a firm, 
after one or more good years, finds itself in a bad year. It can then retrench workers by 
paying them s or it can hold on to the workers in the hope that a good year will come up 
soon and thereby save the cost of the severance payment. This is the decision problem 
that the firm has to solve through dynamic optimization. 
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As before, we shall assume that there are n identical firms each facing a 
production function as in equation (1). As before, a 'good year' is one in which cp = 1 and 
a 'bad year' one in which cp = 0. Let us denote the representative firm's discount factor by 
5 = 1/(1 + r), where 0 < 5 < 1. 
Now, let L and M be the number of workers that a firm employs in a good year 
and in a bad year, respectively. Denoting the present value of a firm's profits, starting 
from a good year, by G and the present value of a firm's profits, starting from a bad year, 
by B, we get the following two equations 
G = f (L) - wL + 5[pG + (1 - p){-s(L - M) + B}] (12) 
B = -wM + 5[pG + (1 - p)B] (13) 
To understand G, note that if we start with a good year, then the firm's profit in that year 
is f(L) - wL. In the following year, if the firm is lucky and has another good year (which 
occurs with probability p) then from that year on, the firm's expected present value is G. 
This explains the third term on the right-hand side of equation (12), 5pG. Next note that 
if the next year is bad, then the firm spends s(L-M) in severance payments and thereafter 
expects the payoff of B. Hence the last term, 8(1-p){-s(L - M) + B}. Equation (13) is 
likewise easy to interpret, remembering that profit in a bad year is -wM, because the firm 
produces nothing, but must pay for the wages.7 Solving (13) for B we have, 
B = [5pG - wM] /[1 - 5(1 - p)]. 
Inserting this in equation (12) and rearranging terms, we get 
G 1-8(1-p) 
1-8 
[f (L) - wL - 8(1 - p)sL] + — [s(1 - 8(1 - p)) - w]M (14) 
1-8 
16 
Let us assume that a firm comes into existence in a good year.8 Hence, the firm's 
problem is to choose L and M to maximize G subject to 0 < M< L. From equation (14), 
it is clear that the relation between G and M is affine. Hence, it is obvious that the firm 
will set M = 0, if s(1-5(1-p)) < w and it will set M = L, if s(1-5(1-p)) > w. 
Suppose now s(1-5(1-p)) < w. From the above paragraph it is clear that the firm 
will choose M = 0. Inserting this in (14), we can work out the firm's first-order condition 
dG 
for maximizing G, — = 0, to be as follows: 
dL 
f (L) = w + 8(1-p)s. (15) 
Next suppose s(1-8(1-p)) > w. Then the firm sets M = L. Inserting this in (14) 
5G 
and working out the first-order condition, = 0, we get 
dL 
w 
f (L) = (16) 
1 - 5(1 - p) 
1 , 1 dG 
Finally, when s( -8(-p)) = w, M can be any value between 0 and L and — = 0 
dL 
turns out to be the same as (15). 
To sum up, the quantities of labor demanded by firms in good and bad years (that 
is, respectively, L and M) are given as follows. 
[s(1-8(1-p)) < w] => [M = 0 and L is chosen so that f '(L) = w + 8(1-p)s] (17) 
[s(1-8(1-p)) > w] => [M = L and L is chosen so that f '(L) = w/{1 -S(1-p)}] (18) 
[s(1-8(1-p)) = w] => [M G [0,L] and L is chosen so that f '(L) = w + 8(1-p)s] (19) 
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Equations (17), (18) and (19) tell us what each firm's demand for labor in a good 
and bad year will be, given the wage, w, and severance payment, s. Our next task is to 
solve for w and check the effect of varying s on the equilibrium wage and employment. 
Let us write the solution from equations (17) - (19) as L(w,s) and M(w,s). We 
will treat these as functions though we know that in some non-generic special cases 
M(w,s) is non-unique. The aggregate demand for labor in any single period is 
pnL(w,s) + (1-p)nM(w,s). 
For simplicity, let us take labor supply to be perfectly inelastic at N. That is, no matter 
what the wage, the supply of labor equals N. 
In equilibrium w must be such that aggregate labor demand equals aggregate 
labor supply: 
pnL(w,s) + (1-p)n M(w,s) = N. (20) 
We can now solve (20) to get the equilibrium wage as a function of the severance 
payment: 
w = w(s), 
the properties of which are derived below. 
In Figure 5, let ABC be the marginal product of labor curve, f '(L). The marginal 
cost of labor, MC, is given by the last terms in (17) - (19): 
fw + 5(1-p)s, if [1-5(1-p)]s<w 
[w/{1-5(1-p)}, otherwise 
Given the marginal product function, in a good year a representative firm demands labor 
up to the point where marginal product equals marginal cost. Hence, the good year 
demand for labor, L, by a representative firm as a function of MC is given by the line 
ABC. 
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To analyze the firm's demand for labor in a bad year, first mark the severance 
payment, s, on the y-axis. This is the amount the firm will have to pay each worker it 
lays off. Note that, if s < MC, it is cheaper to pay the severance payment than employ 
existing workers, and therefore M = 0. This is shown as the dotted line sA. However, if 
s > MC, the workers will be retained as it is more expensive to layoff workers than hiring 
them this period, therefore M = L. Hence the bad year demand for labor, M, as a function 
of MC is given by the line AsBC. 
The left-hand panel in the same figure shows how the wage, w, translates into 
MC. Given a wage, w, the MC may be read off by moving up from w to the line marked 
ZYO and then going horizontally to the y-axis. 
To see why MC = s where the two curves intersect, note that at the point of 
intersection 
w 
= w + 5(1 - p)s. 
1 — 5(1 - p) 
It is easy to juggle this equation and show that when this equation holds, s must be equal 
to the left-hand term (and therefore also the right-hand term). Hence s = MC. 
It is also worth taking note the Z-curve is a vertical shift of the 45o line from the 
origin and as s increases the Z-curve moves up. 
The aggregate demand curve for labor is easily constructed from the right-hand 
panel of Figure 5 and is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 6. In Figure 6, ab is the 
pn-times horizontal blow-up of the line ABC in Figure 5, and ac is the n times horizontal 
blow-up of ABC. The aggregate demand depends on the size of the severance payment. 
If it is s , then the aggregate labor demand is adec. It it is s then it is aghc. The lines 
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marked X and Z are the same as the two lines in the left-hand panel of Figure 5. Recall 
that the line Z moves down as s becomes smaller and coincides with the 45o ray when 
s = 0. 
Superimpose the aggregate supply curve in this figure. This is shown as the 
vertical line through N. The relation between s and w is now easily read off Figure 6. 
Clearly if s = s, the equilibrium wage is w. If s = s , the equilibrium wage is w . As s 
= = 
rises from s to s, the wage rises from w to w . To understand this observe that the 
= = 
aggregate demand curve for labor makes a discontinuous jump from the ab curve to the 
ac curve at MC = s. Hence, as long as s happens to be between s and s, supply equals 
= 
demand exactly at MC = s. Since the X and Z intersect at a height of s and X is 
unchanged as s changes, for all s between s and s, equilibrium wage must be between w 
= 
and w. If s rises above s, the wage remains fixed at w since supply equals demand at 
= = = 
MC = w . If s falls below s, the equilibrium MC clearly remains at s, but the equilibrium 
= 
wage rises. Thus if s = 0, equilibrium occurs at g, MC = s and the wage = wo. It follows 
that the w(s) curve looks as in Figure 7. 
Whether wo exceeds w or not depends on the parameters of the model. But as 
= 
Figure 7 shows, if the severance payment is zero the wage is quite high. As s rises, w 
falls. But after a certain point as s rises, w rises. Hence, the response of the equilibrium 
wage, w, to the statutory severance payment, s, is V-shaped or, more vividly and 
depending a bit on your hand-writing, lower-case-b-shaped. 
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Intuitively, what is happening is this. When s is very low, firms retrench workers 
and make the severance payment whenever they do not need them. So, if s rises, w must 
fall to ensure that aggregate labor demand remains unchanged. Aggregate labor demand 
has to be unchanged in equilibrium because labor supply is perfectly inelastic. As s 
continues to rise, beyond a point, firms become indifferent between retrenching and 
holding on to their workers. For further rises in s, w must rise to keep firms indifferent 
between retrenching and not retrenching workers. Finally, when s becomes sufficiently 
large, there is no retrenchment; so further increases in s have no consequence; and w 
remains unchanged. 
4.2 The Case of Frictional Unemployment 
Up to now we did not discuss who gets the severance payment. We could either 
assume that government collects it as a kind of tax or the worker gets it as compensation. 
If it is the latter, then being dismissed is always desirable from a worker's point of view, 
since equilibrium always being at full employment, the worker gets immediately 
absorbed by the labor market and, in addition, he gets the severance payment. 
To avoid such a phenomenon, let us introduce some frictional unemployment in 
the model. Assume that once a worker is laid-off, he needs to spend one period searching 
before he finds a new job. 
Let E be the number of people employed in each period. Given the assumption 
that frictional unemployment lasts one period, it follows that if (1-p) workers get 
retrenched in each period, then (1-p)E people are unemployed (and searching for new 
jobs) in each period. Since N is the total labor force, it must be that 
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N = E + (1-p)E, 
from which we have 
E = N/(2-p) . (21) 
Therefore, if s < w/{1-S(1-p)}, from (17), we know that the fraction (1-p) of the labor 
force gets retrenched in each period. Hence, (21) holds in that case. 
To see what the equilibrium looks like in that case, suppose s = s (in Fig. 6 and 8). 
By (21), E = N/(2-p). Draw a vertical line at N/(2-p) as shown in Figure 8. Equilibrium, 
in the figure, occurs at k. Hence the equilibrium wage is w* and the total unemployment 
in the economy is N - N/(2-p) = N(1-p)/(2-p). If s is lowered below s, unemployment 
will remain unchanged, but the equilibrium wage will rise. 
The reader may also note that once we allow for frictional unemployment of the 
kind just described we may have a model with multiple equilibria: one with low wage, 
full employment, and another with high wage, frictional unemployment and 
retrenchment. 
5. Conclusion 
In the context of the recent protests in France, against its government’s effort to 
make hiring and firing workers easier—or adopting what is often, euphemistically, called 
‘flexible’ labor laws—and in the context of the ongoing debate in India about repealing 
some of its strongly protective labor laws—it has been argued in popular discourses that 
flexible labor laws could help the economy but at the cost of worker welfare, especially 
the welfare of organized labor. What this paper tries to show is that flexible labor laws 
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can be in the interest of all laborers—that is, easier firing rules can increase employment 
and wages of all workers. The word ‘can’ is however important, because this need not 
always be so. There are contexts where the adoption of more flexible laws can hurt 
workers. This theoretical finding shifts our main task to determining under what 
conditions workers are better off with less protection. A large part of this paper was 
devoted to isolating the conditions. It was shown, for instance, that all workers would be 
better off with more flexible labor laws if entry of new firms into industry happened to be 
easy. 
Our model also demonstrates that in a legal regime where the government 
exogenously specifies the compensation to be paid to a worker who is being retrenched, 
the relation between the size of this compensation and the equilibrium wage rate is V-
shaped. Thus, paradoxically, beyond a certain level, further increases in the exogenously 
specified level of compensation increases labor welfare. 
This theoretical investigation paves the way for empirical work and also further 
analytical research. Among extensions that will be interesting to pursue are the 
incorporation of stochastic shocks which are correlated across firms, and so have 
industry-wide effects; strategic interactions between governments, firms and unions; and 
the effects of partial unionization. In deciding whether a particular country will be better 
off relaxing or making more stringent it’s rules of firing workers, it will be important to 
do empirical work to decide if the nation falls into categories, identified in the paper, 
where we know how the law could affect wages and employment and, hence, labor 
welfare. 
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Appendix 1 
This appendix demonstrates the claim made in Section 2 concerning aggregate 
labor demand in an N-regime with an infinite horizon. 
Suppose a firm takes the decision concerning how much labor to employ only 
after the value of cp has been revealed. Hence, there are two alternative scenarios for 
which we have to solve the firm's problem: cp = 1 or cp = 0. Let the firm's discount factor 
be a constant 5. If the firm employs L units of labor in each period, the present value of 
its profits will be 
[cpf(L) + 8pf(L) + 82pf(L) + ...]-[wL+8wL+82wL+...] 
= cpf (L) -pf (L) +pf (L) /(1 -8 ) - wL /(1 - 8). 
Maximizing this with respect to the choice of L, we get the following first order condition 
f (L) = w/[cp-p)(1-5) + p]. (A1) 
If we wanted to work out the N-regime case in this manner we would have to replace (5) 
with (A1.1) and proceed with the exercise in Section 2 with this replacement. 
Note however that a law which prevents retrenchment makes significant 
difference only if the firm's discount factor, 5, is large. If the next period is unimportant 
to the firm (i.e. 5 = 0) then clearly the firm's demand for labor is unaffected by whether 
regime F or N is in place. To study the effect of a regime switch in its extremity we 
therefore need to consider large 5. Let us therefore consider the case where 8 -» 1. In 
that case the denominator in (A1) goes to p: 
(cp - p)(1-S) + p —» p, as 8 —» 1. 
Therefore in the limit (as 8 -» 1), (A1) becomes 
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f '(L) = w / p. 
But this is exactly equation (5). Hence (6) can be thought of as an expression for labor 
demand in the N-regime, if there were virtually no discounting of the future. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1
 It is worth noting that the state governments of India are allowed to amend this 
legislation of the central government, within certain limits, since labor laws belong to 
what are called ‘concurrent list’ policies in India. Hence, there are some inter-state 
variations that have appeared over the years (Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
2
 One matter that we do not go into explicitly but is important for assessing worker 
welfare in developing and transition economies is the problem of employment in public 
sector concerns. There are interesting parallel questions that arise in that context 
concerning over-staffing and retrenchment. Some of the practical problems arising in 
that context are discussed in Rama (1999). Commenting on state-owned enterprises in 
China, Meng (2000) has drawn our attention to the important fact that restrictions on 
labor policy, such as controls on retrenchment, arise not just from the law but often from 
the prevalent political and social culture. 
3
 This is in contrast to models involving seasonality, in which aggregate demand for labor 
fluctuates from lean season to peak season. While such models are quite common in the 
development literature (see, for instance, Bardhan, 1983; Dreze and Mukherjee, 1989; 
and Ray, 1998), they pertain typically to the agricultural sector. In a model of the 
manufacturing sector, such as ours, it is not unreasonable to think of fluctuations in 
demand for the product of particular firms caused by shifts in demand from one segment 
of the industry to another. Our model may be thought of as a stylized description of this. 
It is not very difficult to incorporate correlated shocks in the model, but given the limited 
33 
objective of the present paper, we have preferred to keep this simple. A more 
sophisticated model would allow for idiosyncratic and correlated shocks. 
4
 It is worth noting that we could, instead of assuming n firms, have assumed that there is 
a continuum of firms, spanning, say, the interval [0,1]. In that case we would get the 
same result without having to use the law of large numbers. 
5
 Let p = ½. By filling in this number in Figure 2, we get a very well-specified rule. If, 
in an F-regime, the equilibrium wage is more than one-third the wage at which demand 
for labor goes to zero, then and only then does a law that bans labor retrenchment lower 
wage and employment and work to the detriment of workers. It is interesting to note that 
this "one-third rule" does not depend on the values of A and B and is also immune to 
different specifications of the labor supply curve. Nevertheless, it is a special rule for a 
special class of models. Our aim in deriving the rule is not to present it as a general 
result, but to illustrate that even when there is full employment and the welfare effects 
can be judged purely in terms of wage rates, the goodness or badness of an anti-
retrenchment law is theoretically ambiguous. 
6
 In case we were working with a Lewis-type perfectly-elastic labor-supply function, the 
worker's preference for avoiding transactions cost would imply that the supply curve in 
the N-regime is below the supply curve in the F-regime. The analysis thereafter proceeds 
in the usual manner. 
7
 In deriving these expressions it is important to treat the firm's decision to employ L and 
M workers in, respectively, the good and bad years as given. Otherwise, if the very first 
year is a bad one and M is positive the firm will be tempted to not employ any one in that 
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year and then onwards employ L and M depending on if it is a good year or a bad year. If 
we want to give the firm this leeway, then we will need to distinguish between two kinds 
of B, namely, B': the present value of the firm's profits starting from a bad year, which is 
however not the first year in the firm's life and B": the present value of the firm's profits 
starting from a bad year, which is also the first year in the firm's life. B" looks like B in 
equation (13) but without the –wM term. Since the B that appears in (12) will have to be 
B', our analysis here remains unaffected by introducing this additional complication. 
8
 We are making this assumption purely for reasons of simplicity. It is easy to alter this 
and check that the essential results remain unchanged if we abandon this assumption. 
